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ABSTRACT 
 
Using the NBER Shared Capitalism Database comprised of over 40,000 employee surveys from 
14 firms, we investigate worker attitudes towards employee ownership, profit sharing, and 
variable pay.  Specifically, our study uses detailed survey questions on preferences over profit 
sharing, forms of employee ownership like company stock and stock option ownership, as well 
as preferences over variable pay in general, to explore how preferences for these different types 
of output-contingent pay vary with worker risk aversion, residual control, and views of co-
workers and management.  Our key results show that, on average, workers want at least a part of 
their compensation to be performance-related, with stronger preferences for output-contingent 
pay schemes among workers who have lower levels of risk aversion, greater residual control 
over the work process, and greater trust of co-workers and management. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, Variable Pay, Worker Preferences, Residual 
Control, Risk Aversion, Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management 
JEL Classifications: J54, J33, M52 
 
Authors:  Fidan Ana Kurtulus (Corresponding Author), Assistant Professor, Department of 
Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 912 Thompson Hall, Amherst, MA, 01003.  
E-mail: fidan@econs.umass.edu.  Tel: (413) 545-2512.  Douglas Kruse, Professor, School of 
Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University, 94 Rockafeller Road, Piscataway, NJ, 
08854.  E-mail: dkruse@rci.rutgers.edu.  Tel: (732) 932-1744.  Joseph Blasi, Professor, School 
of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University, 94 Rockafeller Road, Piscataway, NJ, 
08854.  E-mail: jrbru@hotmail.com.  Tel: (732) 445-5444.  
2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The prevalence of employee ownership, profit sharing and other performance-based pay 
schemes has been growing in the past several decades in the U.S. and other advanced economies.  
According to the 2006 wave of the General Social Survey, which is a nationally representative 
survey of individuals conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, over a third of U.S. 
workers are covered by profit sharing, 18 percent own company stock, and 9 percent own 
company stock options.  Coverage is similar in France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan (Del Boca 
et. al. 1999, Jones and Kato 1995).  A large part of the previous research on shared capitalist pay 
schemes in which employees participate in the financial performance of their place of work has 
focused on the effects of such programs on worker and firm outcomes like productivity, 
turnover, and profits (Craig and Pencavel 1992,  Kruse and Blasi 1997, Kruse 2002, Park, Kruse 
and Sesil 2004).  But an important aspect that has not yet been explored is worker preferences for 
different participatory compensation programs, largely due to the dearth of available datasets that 
are conducive to the analysis of this subject.  The current paper sheds light on this topic by 
examining preferences over profit sharing, forms of employee ownership like company stock and 
stock option ownership, as well as preferences over variable pay in general, and how these 
preferences depend on worker risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of co-workers and 
management.   
Economic theory predicts that workers will be more favorable towards performance-
related pay schemes when they:  i) have low levels of risk aversion, ii) have greater control over 
the work process generating payouts (residual control), iii) trust their co-workers, so that the free 
rider problem associated with group incentives can be overcome by a cooperative solution, and 
iv) trust their managers not to exploit information asymmetries when distributing financial 
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payouts. We investigate the role that each of these factors play in workers’ preferences over 
employee ownership, profit sharing and variable pay using a unique set of questions asked in the 
NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of more than 40,000 employees from 14 firms.  
This is a novel research area in the employee ownership literature and our findings help 
to understand how workers respond to different types of participatory compensation schemes.  
We consider both pay that is tied to overall company performance (profit sharing, company stock 
and stock option ownership), as well as individual performance-based variable pay (individual 
bonuses, commissions), and we will refer to these collectively as financial participation 
throughout the paper. 
A strength of our data is that we have individual-level measures of risk aversion, which is 
often discussed as an important factor in financial participation but is rarely measured.  The 
NBER Shared Capitalism Survey additionally provides unique information on worker residual 
control and worker perceptions of co-workers and management which are also central to our 
analysis.  We use this detailed information to investigate how preferences for different types of 
financial participation are shaped by worker risk aversion, residual control, and views of co-
workers and management.  Our key results show that most workers want at least a part of their 
compensation to be output-contingent, with stronger preferences for performance-related pay 
among workers who have lower levels of risk aversion, greater residual control of the work 
process, and greater trust of co-workers and managers.  
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II. THEORY AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
Our discussion focuses on the following theoretical factors central to perceptions about 
shared capitalism and variable pay: risk aversion, residual control, and trust in co-workers and 
management.   
Worker preferences for employee ownership and other forms of financial participation 
will reflect the perceived potential costs and benefits of such plans.  Risk aversion is viewed as a 
key factor in most theoretical models of pay-for-performance (Holmstrom 1979, Shavell 1979), 
since the variability of rewards can represent a significant cost for risk-averse workers, and has 
indeed been found to reduce preferences for output-contingent pay in laboratory experiments 
(Cadsby, Song, Tapon 2007).  Moreover, people with lower wealth and base salary will generally 
be more averse to financial risk since they have less money for discretionary spending and a 
reduction in income or assets may force them to cut back on necessities.   
Attitudes towards financial participation will also depend on the perceived potential for 
higher income, which will depend on worker skills and opportunities for influencing workplace 
performance.  Workers are likely to view group-based rewards more favorably in the presence of 
practices such as employee involvement in decisions (increasing opportunities to influence 
performance), training (increasing skills that contribute to performance), and job security 
(providing assurance that one will be able to receive the fruits of higher performance).  This can 
be thought of in the context of the theory of residual returns and residual control, which argues 
that those who receive residual returns (financial participation) should also receive residual 
control (power over the work process) in order to provide proper incentives and achieve value-
maximizing decisions (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Jensen and Meckling 1992, Holmstrom and 
Milgrom 1994, Prendergast 2002).  Several empirical studies have found support for this 
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hypothesis (DeVaro and Kurtulus 2010, Ben-Ner, Kong and Lluis 2010, Foss and Laursen 2005).  
Moreover, employee involvement in firm decision-making may create expectations or desires for 
sharing in the fruits of those decisions, and workers may become dispirited without some sort of 
financial reward tied to the consequences of those decisions (Levine and Tyson 1990, Ben-Ner 
and Jones 1995).   
Preferences for rewards based on company performance are also likely to critically 
depend on workers’ perceptions about co-workers.  The well-known free rider problem in group 
incentives has been modeled as a prisoners’ dilemma game, in which each participant has an 
individual incentive to shirk.  If the game is repeated in an ongoing relationship, however, 
several equilibria are possible, including a cooperative equilibrium in which the participants 
establish a collective agreement to cooperate so that the rewards are higher for all participants 
(Axelrod 1984, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986).  Workers in group incentive plans may establish 
and maintain a commitment to high work standards through cooperation and monitoring, which 
can generate higher payouts for workers than in a non-cooperative setting (Weitzman and Kruse, 
1990).    This points to co-worker relations as a key ingredient in the effectiveness of employee 
ownership.  Preferences for employee ownership and profit sharing are likely to be low if 
workers think co-workers are not interested in workplace performance and there is little potential 
for productive cooperation under group-based rewards, and higher if they think co-workers are 
interested in workplace performance and can achieve the cooperative equilibrium in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game by working well together.   
Finally, preferences for financial participation are likely to be shaped by attitudes towards 
management.  First, workers are unlikely to favor variable pay plans if they do not trust 
managers to manage well so that there will be rewards to distribute to workers for their hard 
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work.  The second issue stems from informational asymmetries inherent in many incentive plans: 
it can be difficult for workers to determine whether rewards under variable pay systems are being 
calculated correctly and fairly by management, whereas this is easier under fixed wage contracts 
since workers know exact pay levels ex ante.  One of the objections of unions to profit sharing, 
for example, is mistrust that managers will calculate profits in a way that properly rewards 
workers for their performance (Zalusky 1986, Zalusky 1990).  If workers do not trust managers 
to calculate the payouts from financial participation in a competent and honest way, they will be 
less interested in participating.   
In sum, based on theory and past research, we expect attitudes towards financial 
participation to be more positive among workers who are less risk averse, have more residual 
control, and who trust management and think co-workers are more interested in workplace 
performance. 
There has been little published research on the topic of worker attitudes towards financial 
participation.  Kruse and Blasi (1999) summarize thirty public polls conducted between 1975 and 
1997 with questions on general perceptions about financial participation systems, finding that a 
majority of people expressed favorable views of employee ownership and its effects on 
workplaces; for instance, in one survey 75 percent said they would like to work for an employee-
owned and -controlled company, as opposed to a company owned by outside investors or 
government, and in another survey 69 percent thought employee-owners work harder.  A number 
of studies have examined the effect of variable pay on overall job satisfaction among British 
workers: Green and Heywood (2008) found that performance-related pay in general was 
associated with increased job satisfaction, Brown and Sessions (2003) showed that workers who 
participated in performance bonuses, share ownership, and profit sharing were more satisfied 
7 
 
with their work environment, and McCausland et. al. (2005) found that the influence of 
performance pay increased satisfaction for the more highly paid but lowered it for the less highly 
paid.  Drago, Estrin and Wooden (1992) found the use of individual and group bonuses to be a 
positive determinant of job satisfaction in a sample of Australian workers.  Cornelissen, 
Heywood and Jirjahn (2008) showed that among German workers who received performance 
pay, risk aversion was inversely correlated with overall job satisfaction.   
Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating worker preference for various 
forms of financial participation and how these preferences depend on key worker and workplace 
characteristics. 
 
III. DATA AND VARIABLES 
We use the NBER Shared Capitalism Database, which consists of detailed information 
collected from more than 40,000 employee surveys from 14 firms, to explore preferences for 
different forms of employee ownership and variable pay.  The NBER data comprise one of the 
largest worker-level datasets on labor practices and worker sentiment ever collected. The survey 
was conducted during 2002-2006 using a combination of web-based and paper survey methods, 
and had a high response rate, averaging 53 percent over the 14 companies. The firms 
participating in the survey included large multinationals with employment spanning North 
America, South America, Europe and Asia, as well as smaller firms with mostly US employees. 
The sample included eight firms in the manufacturing industry, two high-technology firms, and 
four in the service industry. Three of the fourteen companies exceeded 10,000 employees, five 
employed between 1,000 and 10,000 workers, and the remaining six employed fewer than 1,000 
workers. All of the firms had employee ownership, profit sharing and variable pay programs, 
though of varying forms and degrees: thirteen had individual bonus plans, nine had workgroup-
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based or department-based performance bonus plans, eleven had broad-based profit sharing 
plans, five had broad-based stock option plans, eight had standard employee stock ownership 
plans (ESOPs), one had a 401(k) employee stock ownership program, four had employee stock 
purchase plans, and three had 401(k)’s with company stock. Most had combinations of these 
plans.  
To investigate the role that risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of co-workers 
and management play in workers’ preferences for financial participation, we make use of a 
unique set of questions asked in the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey capturing these concepts.  
We now turn to a discussion of the key variables used in our empirical analyses. 
Dependent Variables 
We examine four variables reflecting worker preferences for financial participation as 
dependent variables in our regression analyses.  The first one captures worker preferences for 
variable pay broadly and is based on a question asked in the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey 
indicating the percentage of pay the respondent would like to receive as variable compensation 
(which includes all forms of output-contingent pay that is based on individual, group and 
company performance).  Next we examine worker preferences for various forms of employee 
ownership based on questions indicating the respondent’s preference for being paid at least in 
part based on company performance (profit sharing, company stock, or stock options), 
preference for the extent to which the respondent’s next pay increase depends on company 
performance, and preference for getting a portion of compensation in the form of company stock 
and stock options.  These four dependent variables are defined formally below.  
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Worker Preferences for Financial Participation: 
Preference for Variable Pay Proportion of pay the worker would like to receive as variable 
compensation (13 firms surveyed) 
Preference for Company-Based 
Incentives 
Dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker prefers that he or she 
be paid in part with a variable amount dependent on company 
performance, through profit sharing, company stock, or stock 
options; 0 if all fixed wage or salary, with no profit sharing, 
company stock, or stock options (13 firms surveyed) 
Preference for Company-Based 
Incentives in Next Pay Increase 
Worker’s preference that his or her next pay increase come in 
the form of 1 = All fixed wages, with no profit sharing, 
company stock, or stock options; 2 = Split between fixed 
wages and profit sharing, company stock, or stock options; 3 = 
All in the form of profit sharing, company stock, or stock 
options (5 firms surveyed) 
Preference for Stock Over 
Cash Incentives 
Worker’s preference for getting some of his or her 
compensation from company stock and stock options as 
opposed to a cash incentive plan on a 1 (cash incentive plan) to 
5 (company stock and stock options) scale (3 firms surveyed) 
 
Key Independent Variables 
The key independent variables in our analysis are those that capture worker risk aversion, 
residual control, and perceptions of co-workers and management. 
One of the unique features of the NBER Survey is the presence of information on 
individual-level risk aversion, which plays a central role in theoretical models of the employee-
employer relationship, but is rarely available in existing datasets.  Our primary measure of the 
extent to which the worker is averse to risk is based on the NBER Survey question ―Some people 
like to take risks and others dislike taking risks.  Where would you place yourself on a scale of 
how much you like or dislike taking risks, where 0 is hating to take any kind of risk and 10 is 
loving to take risks?‖, from which we define variable Risk Averse such that values greater than or 
equal to 7 on this scale correspond to ―low risk aversion‖, greater than 3 and less than 7 is 
―medium risk aversion‖, and less than or equal to 3 is ―high risk aversion‖.  As discussed earlier, 
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people with lower wealth and base salary will generally be more averse to financial risk since 
pay variability that results in pay reduction is more likely to force them to cut back on 
necessities, so we also examine the worker’s annual base salary and family wealth under the 
framework of risk aversion. 
Risk Aversion Variables: 
Risk Averse Worker’s self-assessment of his risk preference, where 1 = Low risk 
aversion; 2 = Medium risk aversion; 3 = High risk aversion. 
Base Pay Worker’s annual base pay the previous year excluding overtime, bonuses 
and commissions (in thousands) 
Wealth Assets of the worker and the worker’s spouse including the value of their 
house minus the mortgage, their vehicles, stocks and mutual funds, cash, 
checking accounts, retirement accounts including 401(k) and pension assets 
(in thousands) 
 
The second key element that is likely to shape attitudes towards financial participation is 
residual control, or the ability to influence one’s potential for higher income, which will depend 
on worker skills and opportunities to influence workplace performance through employee 
involvement in decision-making, training, and assurance that the worker can reap the rewards of 
higher performance through job security.  These variables, which we group under the heading 
residual control, are defined below. 
Residual Control Variables: 
Decision-Making Dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker is involved in organized 
workplace decision-making through teams, committees or task forces that 
address workplace issues such as product quality, cost cutting, 
productivity, health and safety; 0 otherwise 
Training Dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker received any formal training 
from the employer in the last 12 months, such as in classes or seminars 
sponsored by the employer; 0 otherwise 
Job Security Dummy variable equaling 1 if the worker’s response to the question 
―Thinking about the next twelve months, how likely do you think it is that 
you will lose your job or be laid off?‖ is ―not at all likely‖ or ―not too 
likely‖; 0 if the worker’s response is ―very likely‖ or ―fairly likely‖. 
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As discussed earlier, preferences for company performance-based rewards in particular 
are likely to depend on workers’ perceptions about whether their co-workers are committed to 
workplace performance and whether they trust management to distribute payouts from 
workplace rewards correctly.  We therefore include the below two independent variables.  
Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management: 
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement Worker’s perception of his or her co-workers’ interest and 
involvement in company-wide issues on a 1-7 scale, with 1 
indicating little interest and involvement and 7 indicating 
great interest and involvement 
Management Trustworthiness Worker’s perception of the trustworthiness of his company 
in keeping its promises on a 0-4 scale, with 0 indicating not 
trustworthy and 4 indicating highly trustworthy 
  
Control Variables 
Beyond the variables that are central to our analysis, all of our regression models include 
a rich array of worker and workplace characteristics as control variables.  These are worker 
demographic variables including gender, age, and education level; and job characteristics 
variables including occupation, managerial level, firm tenure, whether the worker is closely 
supervised, and whether pay is at or above market level.  We also control for the ease with which 
workers can observe their co-workers’ effort, since this is likely to influence the extent to which 
perceptions about how involved co-workers are in company issues (Co-Worker Interest and 
Involvement), one of the main independent variables we consider, affects preferences for shared 
capitalism.  Fuller definitions and descriptive statistics of these control variables are provided in 
the Appendix.   
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
As a first step in our empirical analysis, we will examine unconditional means of our 
main dependent variables to explore preferences over financial participation broadly across all 
workers in our sample.  Second, we will examine how preferences for financial participation 
vary with worker risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of co-workers and management 
by estimating cross-sectional regressions of attitudes on these main independent variables, 
controlling for the array of worker and workplace characteristics described above.  We will 
estimate least squares, probit, and multinomial probit models, depending on whether the 
dependent variable is a continuous, dummy, or multi-valued variable, respectively.   
It is important to note that these cross-sectional regression models do not capture causal 
relationships, but rather conditional correlations among the variables of interest.  For example, it 
is possible that workers with a greater preference for financial participation sort themselves into 
firms with greater use of financial participation, greater residual control for workers, and 
workplace climates with high levels of trust.  We investigated this possibility by also estimating 
regressions that included firm fixed effects, with very similar results for the variables of interest; 
in the paper we report the results without firm effects to take advantage of both within- and 
between-firm variation.  It also remains possible that within a firm, workers will be sorted into 
jobs based on personal characteristics correlated with preferences over financial participation.  It 
may be, for example, that being in a decision-making team does not create greater interest in 
financial participation, but workers with greater interest in financial participation select 
themselves into positions that are part of decision-making teams.  Even in the latter case, finding 
a positive relationship strongly suggests an important linkage between residual control and 
residual returns for workers.  So while we cannot definitively determine causality (as with most 
non-experimental data), our results will nonetheless shed important light on how preferences for 
13 
 
financial participation are related to worker risk aversion, residual control and workplace 
climate, and the conditions under which variable pay plans are viewed positively by workers and 
are most likely to be effective. 
 
V. UNCONDITIONAL STATISTICS 
Summary statistics for the main variables used in our empirical analyses are shown in 
Table 1, along with distribution charts for selected variables.  Most workers desire between 0 and 
30 percent of their compensation to be comprised of variable pay, though there is considerable 
variation in this preference across workers as illustrated in Figure 1, with an average of 20 
percent (Preference for Variable Pay).  When asked whether workers prefer to be paid at least in 
part with variable pay that depends on company performance through profit sharing, company 
stock or stock options, as opposed to getting all fixed salary, a vast majority of respondents, 78 
percent, say they prefer to have some company performance-dependent variable pay (Preference 
for Company-Based Incentives).  Only 27 percent of workers would like their next pay increase 
to come in the form of all fixed wages with no profit sharing, company stock or stock options, 
while 60 percent would like a combination of the two types, and 13 percent would like their next 
raise to consist entirely of profit sharing, company stock or stock options (Preference for 
Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase).  Workers’ preferences in favor of company-
performance-based pay is also evident in the distribution of the variable Preference for Stock 
Over Cash Incentives, where most workers picked categories 3 and 4 on a scale of 1 to 5 
indicating their preference for getting some of their compensation from stock and stock options 
as opposed to a cash incentive plan. 
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VI. WHICH WORKERS PREFER FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION? 
The above discussion showed that most workers want at least a part of their 
compensation to be output-contingent, and prefer to be paid at least in part based on company 
performance.  But it may well be that there is variation across these attitudes by the worker’s 
degree of risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of co-workers and management.  We 
now explore what types of workers prefer variable pay, and what kinds of variable pay they 
prefer, by estimating regressions of our various preference measures on the main independent 
variables of interest, and controls.   
Table 2 illustrates least squares regression results for Preference for Variable Pay, 
indicating the proportion of total pay the worker would like to receive as variable compensation, 
and provides strong support for our hypothesis on the relationship between risk aversion and 
preferences for variable pay: the proportion of compensation workers would like to receive as 
variable pay is negatively related with their degree of risk aversion—an increase in risk aversion 
from the ―low‖ category to the ―high‖ category is associated with a decrease in the desired 
proportion of pay comprised of variable compensation of over 8 percentage points, on average.  
Also, the proportion of compensation workers would like to receive as variable pay is 
statistically significantly positively related with family wealth and base salary which can insulate 
workers against fluctuations in compensation created by variable pay.  Second, there is some 
support for the hypothesis that workers have greater preference for residual rewards when they 
also have residual control—the proportion of pay the worker desires in his or her compensation 
is significantly positively related with employee involvement in workplace decision-making, and 
is also positively related with formal job training and job security though these last two estimates 
are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  Third, in support of our hypothesis on 
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perceptions of co-workers and management, preference for variable pay is positively related with 
co-worker interest and involvement in company-wide issues and trust in management, and both 
of these relationships are statistically significant at the one percent level, indicating that workers 
are more interested in shared capitalism when they can trust others in the workplace.
1,2
 
Table 3 illustrates the probit marginal effects for Prob(Preference for Company-Based 
Incentives=1), the probability that the worker prefers that he or she be paid in part with variable 
pay based on company performance (such as profit sharing, company stock, and stock options) 
over being paid fully in the form of fixed salary.  We find even stronger evidence in favor of our 
hypotheses here than in the previous table:  preference for company-performance-contingent pay 
is negatively associated with risk aversion, positively associated with family wealth and base 
salary, positively associated with all three measures of residual control, and positively associated 
with confidence in co-workers and management, as predicted.   
We next turn to workers’ preferences over the portion of pay increases comprised of 
company-performance-based variable pay by focusing on the three-valued Preference for 
Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase, which equals 1 if the worker prefers that his or 
her next pay increase is comprised of all fixed wages, with no profit sharing, company stock, or 
                                                 
1
 Apart from these main results on how preferences for variable pay depend on risk aversion, residual control and 
perceptions of co-workers and management, we also uncovered some interesting findings on the relationships 
between the control variables and Preference for Variable Pay.  For example, women have a lower preference for 
variable pay, which aligns with evidence from past studies using laboratory and field experiments that women tend 
to be more risk averse than men (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Dohmen et. al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2006).  We 
also find that workers in sales and customer service occupations have the strongest preference in favor of variable 
pay, a possible explanation for which is that output is more readily linkable to individual performance than for 
workers in many other occupations (e.g., number of units sold or number of customers assisted), and this reduces 
problems of free-riding so that such workers may view output-contingent compensation as a more fruitful reward for 
their effort.  Among other interesting results is that workers with longer tenure at the firm prefer a lower share of 
variable pay, supporting the idea that workers who are closer to retirement are often loathe to introduce risk into 
their compensation as they have less time remaining in the labor market to recoup potential losses.  To streamline 
and focus our discussion around the key variables of interest (risk aversion, residual control, perceptions of co-
workers and management) we do not present these results in the paper, but they are available from the authors. 
2
 Since Preference for Variable Pay  has a lower bound of zero we also estimated an analogous regression using a 
tobit model and obtained very similar results. 
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stock options; 2 if it is split between fixed wages and profit sharing, company stock, or stock 
options; and 3 if it is all in the form of profit sharing, company stock, or stock options.  Table 4 
illustrates marginal effects from a multinomial probit regression of Preference for Company-
Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase on our risk aversion, residual control, and co-worker and 
management perceptions variables, and worker controls, with the three columns corresponding to 
the probability that a worker chooses values 1, 2, or 3, respectively.  We find that workers who 
are more risk averse are less likely to want their next pay increase to be partly or completely 
comprised of company-performance-based pay, and more likely to prefer that it is entirely 
comprised of fixed wages, corroborating our hypothesized relationship between risk aversion and 
attitudes toward financial participation.  On the other hand, wealth and salary do not exhibit 
statistically significant relationships with Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay 
Increase.  Table 4 provides mixed evidence supporting the notion that residual control improves 
preference for residual returns: job training and job security are associated with a higher 
likelihood of preferring one’s next pay increase to be comprised of both company performance 
related pay and fixed wages, though the relationship between employee involvement in decision-
making and Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase is not statistically 
significant.  Finally, though trust in management is associated with wanting a portion of one’s 
pay raise to be contingent on company performance, co-worker interest and involvement in 
company-wide issues does not have a statistically significant relation with Preference for 
Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase. 
Table 5 shows results from a least squares regression of preference for receiving some 
compensation from company stock and stock options as opposed to a cash incentive plan on a 1 
to 5 scale (Preference for Stock Over Cash Incentives).  We can interpret this as capturing 
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whether the respondent prefers having stock or cash in his or her pocket.  The worker’s self-
assessment of his or her own risk aversion is strongly negatively correlated with preference for 
stock-based compensation as opposed to cash incentives, as expected.  However, family wealth 
and base salary have a statistically significant positive, albeit small, correlation with preference 
for stock-based compensation over cash incentives.  All of our residual control variables and 
management and co-worker trust variables are positively related to Preference for Stock Over 
Cash Incentives, in support of our hypotheses.
3
   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper uses the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey to study a relatively unexplored 
topic in the research on participatory pay schemes, namely worker preferences for employee 
ownership, profit sharing and variable pay, and how these preferences depend on three key 
worker and workplace characteristics: worker risk aversion, residual control, and perceptions of 
co-workers and management. 
We find that, on average, workers desire around 20 percent of their compensation to be 
comprised of variable pay.  Most workers prefer to be paid at least in part based on company 
performance, through profit sharing, company stock, or stock options, and in particular they 
prefer getting stock and stock options as opposed to cash incentives. 
Furthermore, our regression results clearly indicate that risk aversion is a major factor 
reducing preferences for variable pay plans.  This is supported not only by the strong coefficients 
on the risk aversion variable, but also by the coefficients on two key employee characteristics 
that are expected to be related to risk preferences, namely base pay and family wealth. 
                                                 
3
 As a robustness check we also estimated all of our regressions with firm fixed effects, and the results were very 
similar to the baseline results we report here, both in magnitude and significance.  These additional results are 
available from the authors. 
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An important finding, though, is that workplace policies help to improve worker 
perceptions of variable pay.  The finding that workers are more likely to prefer performance-
based pay if they have decision-making power, formal job training, and job security at their 
workplace  supports the theory that residual control and residual returns are complementary.  
Future research would be valuable on the form of this relationship (e.g., linear or non-linear, 
including whether there are threshold effects), and whether complementary residual control 
practices can help make shared capitalism more appealing to groups who are more risk-averse. 
Workplace culture also is a key variable.  Workers are unlikely to favor variable pay 
plans if they do not trust managers (either to manage well so that there will be rewards, or to 
calculate rewards accurately and honestly).  Their attitudes are also influenced by how they 
perceive their co-workers:  if they have little reason to expect their co-workers to perform well 
under a performance-based pay plan, they will not be optimistic about the prospect for rewards.   
The findings on workplace policies and trust of co-worker and managers indicate that 
preferences over variable pay plans are not determined by any fixed mindset or personal 
characteristic of workers, but appear to depend on the context in which the plans are 
implemented.  This is consistent with research on the performance effects of employee 
ownership and profit sharing, which shows that while these plans are associated with higher 
performance effects on average, there is substantial dispersion in estimated effects across and 
within samples (Doucialiagos, 2005; Kaarsemakar, 2006; Freeman, 2007).  This dispersion is 
likely to be explained in part by employees’ neutral or negative reactions in workplaces that do 
not provide supportive environments, in contrast to positive reactions with increased employee 
effort and cooperation when the environment is supportive.  Research has begun to identify how 
specific workplace policies condition the effects of group incentive plans (Kruse et al., 2010).  
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Further research that delves into the role of workplace policies and cultures in financial 
participation would be valuable in determining how and when these plans can affect performance 
and worker welfare, and the likelihood that they may expand in the 21
st
 century.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Worker and Workplace Control Variables 
 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Obs. 
Female 1 if worker is female; 0 otherwise 0.312 0.463 38,325 
Age Worker age 40.933 10.503 36,791 
No High School 1 if worker does not hold a high school 
degree; 0 otherwise 0.037 0.189 35,758 
High School 1 if worker’s highest educational degree is 
a high school degree including GED; 0 
otherwise 0.230 0.421 35,758 
Some College 1 if worker has attended some college but 
has not received a bachelor’s degree; 0 
otherwise 0.217 0.412 35,758 
Associate Degree 1 if worker’s highest educational degree is 
an associate’s degree; 0 otherwise 0.084 0.277 35,758 
College 1 if worker’s highest educational degree is 
a bachelor’s degree; 0 otherwise 0.280 0.449 35,758 
Grad School 1 if worker’s highest educational degree is 
a master’s, professional or doctoral 
degree; 0 otherwise 0.138 0.344 39,436 
Production 1 if worker’s occupation is production; 0 
otherwise 0.434 0.496 45,816 
Administrative 
Support 
1 if worker’s occupation is administrative 
support; 0 otherwise 0.061 0.238 45,816 
Professional and 
Technical 
1 if worker’s occupation is professional 
and technical (including engineers and 
scientists); 0 otherwise 0.295 0.456 45,816 
Sales and Customer 
Service 
if worker’s occupation is sales and 
customer service; 0 otherwise 0.085 0.280 45,816 
Lower Management 1 if worker’s occupation is lower 
management (including front-line 
supervisors); 0 otherwise 0.101 0.302 45,816 
Middle 
Management 
1 if worker’s occupation is middle 
management (including managers and 
directors); 0 otherwise 0.075 0.263 45,816 
Upper Management 1 if worker’s occupation is top 
management (executives); 0 otherwise 0.022 0.147 45,816 
At Market Salary 1 if the worker believes that his annual 
base salary at the firm is at or above the 
going market rate for employees in other 
companies with similar experience and 
job descriptions in the region; 0 otherwise 0.592 0.491 36,236 
Tenure Worker’s tenure at the firm, in years 9.540 8.979 45,755 
Hours Worker’s weekly hours worked 45.789 8.137 45,696 
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Close Supervision Measure of how closely the worker is 
supervised on a 0-10 scale, with 0 
indicating that the worker works 
independently of close supervision and 10 
indicating the worker is closely supervised 
3.347 2.631 45,978 
See Co-Workers Worker’s rating of how easy it is for him 
to see whether his co-workers are working 
well or poorly on a 1-10 scale 
6.784 2.740 45,874 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Means, Standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Obs. 
Dependent Variables    
Preference for Variable Pay 19.560 18.368 12,804 
Preference for Company-Based Incentives 0.783 0.412 13,543 
Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase 1.862 0.616 26,626 
Preference for Stock Over Cash Incentives 3.076 1.277 7,994 
Risk Aversion    
Risk Averse 1.786 0.755 41,695 
Base Pay 54.820 41.997 30,457 
Wealth 288.327 586.784 32,466 
Residual Control    
Decision-Making 0.348 0.476 42,865 
Training 0.562 0.496 43,067 
Job Security 0.843 0.364 43,807 
Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management    
Co-worker Interest and Involvement 4.217 1.599 42,809 
Management Trustworthiness 2.328 1.152 42,437 
Note: Based on the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of N = 46,907 workers. 
 
Panel B: Distribution Tables  
Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase: Freq. Percent 
1 (all fixed wage) 7,143 26.83 
2 16,014 60.14 
3 (all company-performance-based pay) 3,469 13.03 
Total 26,626 100 
 
 
Preference for Stock Over Cash Incentives: Freq. Percent 
1 (cash incentives) 1,229 15.37 
2 1,279 16 
3 2,412 30.17 
4 1,804 22.57 
5 (stock, options) 1,270 15.89 
Total 7,994 100 
Note: Based on the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of N = 46,907 workers. 
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Figure 1: Kernel Density for Preference for Variable Pay 
 
Note: Based on the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of N = 46,907 workers.  We 
use an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwith 2.0128. 
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Table 2: Relationship Between Preference for Variable Pay and Risk Aversion, Residual 
Control, and Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management 
 Dependent Variable: Preference for Variable Pay 
Risk Aversion  
 Risk Averse -4.173*** 
  (0.265) 
 Base Pay 0.051*** 
  (0.005) 
 Wealth 0.002*** 
  (0.000) 
Residual Control  
 Decision-Making 0.974** 
  (0.399) 
 Training 0.671 
  (0.455) 
 Job Security 0.626 
  (0.734) 
Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management  
 Co-Worker Interest and Involvement 0.427*** 
  (0.127) 
 Management Trustworthiness 0.720*** 
  (0.188) 
Worker and Workplace Controls 
Constant 
 
Observations 
Adjusted R-squared 
YES 
10.580*** 
(2.678) 
8289 
0.220 
Note: Results are from a least squares regression model.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.   The model also 
includes the full set of worker and workplace controls described in the Data and Variables 
Section. 
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Table 3: Relationship Between Preference for Company-Based Incentives and Risk Aversion, 
Residual Control, and Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management 
 Pr(Preference for Company-Based Incentives=1) 
Risk Aversion  
Risk Averse -0.046*** 
 (0.005) 
Base Pay 0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Wealth 0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
Residual Control 
Decision-Making 0.031*** 
 (0.007) 
Training 0.027*** 
 (0.008) 
Job Security 0.034*** 
 (0.013) 
Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management 
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement 0.009*** 
 (0.002) 
Management Trustworthiness 0.021*** 
 (0.003) 
Worker and Workplace Controls YES 
Observations 8580 
Pseudo R-squared 0.202 
Note: Results are probit marginal effects for Prob(Preference for Company-Based Incentives=1) 
evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary independent variables, the 
change in the predicted Prob(Preference for Company-Based Incentives=1) when the 
independent variable increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at their means). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 
level; *** at the .01 level.   The model also includes the full set of worker and workplace 
controls described in the Data and Variables Section. 
  
29 
 
Table 4: Relationship Between Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase 
and Risk Aversion, Residual Control, and Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management 
 Pr(Preference for  
Company-Based 
Incentives 
 in Next Pay 
Increase=1) 
Pr(Preference for  
Company-Based 
Incentives  
in Next Pay 
Increase =2) 
Pr(Preference for  
Company-Based 
Incentives in 
Next Pay 
Increase =3) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Risk Aversion    
Risk Averse 0.052*** -0.032*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Base Pay 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wealth 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Residual Control    
Decision-Making -0.012 0.004 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) 
Training -0.021*** 0.028*** -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) 
Job Security -0.006 0.025* -0.018** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) 
Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management 
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Management Trustworthiness -0.026*** 0.024*** 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Worker and Workplace Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 13363 13363 13363 
Note: Results in each column are multinomial probit marginal effects for Prob(Preference for 
Company-Based Incentives in Next Pay Increase =1), Prob(Preference for Company-Based 
Incentives in Next Pay Increase =2), and Prob(Preference for Company-Based Incentives in Next 
Pay Increase =3), respectively, evaluated at the mean of the independent variable or, for binary 
independent variables, the change in the predicted probability when the independent variable 
increases from 0 to 1 (evaluating all other covariates at their means). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.   
The models also include the full set of worker and workplace controls described in the Data and 
Variables Section. 
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Table 5: Relationship Between Preference for Stock Over Cash Incentives and Risk Aversion, 
Residual Control, and Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management 
 Dependent Variable: Preference for Stock Over 
Cash Incentives 
Risk Aversion  
Risk Averse -0.231*** 
 (0.022) 
Base Pay 0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
Wealth 0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
Residual Control  
Decision-Making 0.140*** 
 (0.031) 
Training 0.102*** 
 (0.037) 
Job Security 0.175*** 
 (0.058) 
Perceptions of Co-Workers and Management 
Co-Worker Interest and Involvement 0.075*** 
 (0.010) 
Management Trustworthiness 0.162*** 
 (0.015) 
Worker and Workplace Controls YES 
Constant 1.373*** 
 (0.248) 
Observations 6766 
Adjusted R-squared 0.151 
Note: Results are from a least squares regression model.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.   The model also 
includes the full set of worker and workplace controls described in the Data and Variables 
Section. 
 
 
